When Will Be The Take Over?

September 16 has come and gone, with no change in government. While I will leave an analysis of the implications of this for another time, the mechanism by which Pakatan Rakyat would take power is worth examining.

After all, September 16 falls smack in the middle of Parliament’s recess, which will last for about two weeks more; how can the government fall when Parliament cannot meet to pass a vote of no-confidence? Most speculation here suggests that Pakatan leaders would meet with the Yang di-Pertuan Agong submitting the names of MPs supporting the new government. But I think a very plausible, if not likely scenario is the Prime Minister simply tendering his resignation.

After all, most analyses assume a hostile takeover. But the last thing Pakatan wants is instability and resistance from the politicised institutions of our country. To form a new government, Pakatan would want more than just the support of a slim majority of MPs; it would require some sort of acquiescence from at least a few of the elite in the current government.

If the present government does not acquiesce, if it fights tooth and nail to hold on to power, it will jail MPs indiscriminately, do anything it can to prevent a vote of no-confidence in Parliament; it will commence a scorched-earth campaign to ensure Pakatan can get nothing of value when it takes power, while salting away its own ill-gotten gains in offshore bank accounts.

So ultimately at the very least we must have a Prime Minister willing to let go of power, and willing to step down. And if we are willing to accept that Abdullah Badawi will let himself be voted out of power, why not go one step further? I think there are grounds to believe that he may simply resign before things get to that stage.

If Anwar Ibrahim, the Leader of the Opposition, can broker a deal with Abdullah to ensure a smooth and orderly transition of power, both men will benefit immensely. Thus far it seems clear that history will not judge Abdullah very well; at best, his attempts to reform the government were stillborn and half-hearted. But if Abdullah becomes the first Prime Minister to make way for a real change in government, if he places institutions above politics and personal gain, his reputation will be significantly rehabilitated.

You may say that this is not much, but look at it another way: he is definitely going out as Prime Minister, with no concrete accomplishments to his name. It is unlikely that he will last until 2010, with so many within his own party baying for blood. Whoever succeeds him as Prime Minister is unlikely to lavish him with praise or mark his administration with pride; Abdullah’s term as premier will at best be seen as a benchwarmer for his successor, and at worst, be seen as setting Malaysia down a dangerous and poorly-planned path. Considering the relative vehemence of calls for him to step down, it is probable that his leadership would be vilified by the government-authored history books; Abdullah would be lucky if his term was just ignored and forgotten.

On the other hand, if Anwar takes power, Anwar does not have much to gain from going after Abdullah. He will be too busy fixing broken institutions and dealing with the day-to-day problems of governance to make Abdullah-hating a priority; it would be especially unseemly for him to denounce the man who so generously made way for him to accede to the premiership. Accusations of corruption and impropriety on Abdullah’s part aside, the fact is, Abdullah is hardly criminally responsible for our nation’s problems today; even if the new Pakatan government tried to hunt him down, it would not solve any fundamental problem.

If anything, Pakatan will probably see to it that Abdullah goes down in the history books as a visionary Prime Minister who presided over the rebirth of democracy in Malaysia, and whose attempts to reform our institutions were blocked by shortsighted bigots in his own political party.

You may think this kind of historical rewriting is unlikely or unseemly, but it has already happened: the case of Dato Onn Ja’afar comes to mind. Dato Onn today is seen by everyone — including the government historians — as a man ahead of his time in trying to found a multiracial party. What we don’t remember is his bitter return to racism after his own party failed; some historians actually blame his rhetoric for spurring UMNO to outdo him in fighting for ketuanan Melayu.

The raw material for Abdullah’s reimaging as a visionary ahead of his time, blocked by dunderheads in his own party, is already there: his attempts to reform our institutions, his redefinition of ketuanan Melayu into a positive ideology empowering the Malays to stand on their own two feet as equal partners with other Malaysians. Abdullah can easily go down in history as one of our best Prime Ministers, given the right spin. The only thing is, he has zero chance of this happening if an UMNO man succeeds him, while it is very likely he will eventually be hailed as a great patriot if he makes way for a Pakatan leader.

For Anwar, Abdullah stepping down solves a lot of key headaches. For one, there is no need to go through the vote of no-confidence; the Agong has complete discretion in appointing the Prime Minister if the post falls vacant (one of the very few real discretionary powers the Agong has). Anwar can meet with the Agong and submit a list of MPs who have agreed to support him, and once the Agong actually appoints him as PM, it is very unlikely that MPs would be falling over themselves to pass a vote of no-confidence against the Pakatan government.

The matter is smoothed over even more if Abdullah states that he has made way for Anwar, and that Pakatan has enough MPs on its side to make things work. With that statement, the Agong appointing Anwar would be a simple enough formality. There’s not even a need for Parliament to meet, and if the handover occurs this month, the Parliamentary recess gives Anwar breathing room to form a Cabinet and start governing, building momentum on his side and further forestalling any Barisan move to topple him. It’s a huge logistical win for Anwar if he can accomplish it.
Moreover, Anwar and Abdullah will have ammunition at the ready to face down their opponents from UMNO.

I quit because you wanted me to, Abdullah can say. It’s clear I didn’t have your confidence, as you can see from the defection of your colleagues and your own voracious calls for me to step down. And the King himself appointed me, Anwar will say. Do you really want to question the King’s decision? Spinning themselves out of this situation will be fairly straightforward, I believe, especially with public opinion on Pakatan’s side.

So is it any wonder that Pakatan’s agenda at the moment is to meet first with the Prime Minister, before seeking an audience with the Agong? I would not be surprised at all if a deal like this winds up being cut eventually. It benefits both the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition; it benefits the country by bequeathing it some stability and smoothness in the transition; everyone comes out smelling like roses.

Ultimately it is not to Pakatan’s benefit to form a government speedily but haphazardly. A Pakatan legislator I met three weeks ago told me that they were then sorting out a smooth transition with institutions such as the Police and military. The excuse of stability they presently cite may seem weak but I believe it holds water.

History hinges on Abdullah’s decision: to quit or not to quit? His position is growing increasingly untenable. It’s a question of when, not if, he will step down as a lame-duck Prime Minister. But one successor offers the real potential of fixing the country and its government, and the temptation of going down in history as a great Prime Minister ahead of his time. The other successor offers more of the same under a different name, and the probable vilification of Abdullah’s name in the history books. I think Abdullah would be a fool not to make way for Anwar, if Anwar has any Barisan MPs at all on his side — and that I think he does.

by JohnLeemk@Dartmouth
(dated September 18, 2008)

泰柬印菲18岁可参政

专访/摄影：程文慧

（韩视网独家报道）政坛新兵槟岛市议员黄吉兴说：“政府应该降低年轻人的参政年龄，向泰国、柬埔塞、印尼和菲律宾等国家看齐，这4个国家的合法参政年龄是18岁。”

大马公民需满21岁

也 是人民公正党后起之秀的黄吉兴表示，大马公民届满21岁后，才有资格参政，来到40至45岁时还可竞选青年团团长职，似乎略嫌慢了一拍，导致许 多年轻人对政治出现冷感，所以，政府应该开放参政的年龄，让中学生和大学生在校园里就有机会接触到政治，这样一来相信可以提升年轻人的政治意识。

308政治大风吹后，一石激起千层浪，槟州政府及地方政府文武百官大洗牌，黄吉兴也是其中一名被推荐为槟岛市议员的公正党年轻党员，目前是升旗山区宣传局主任兼植物园区州议员王康立的特别助理。

在大山脚卓坤安华老家遇见黄吉兴，当时他穿著黑色的马来人传统服饰，与王康立 一起向安华握手问安。闲聊数句，发现这位年轻人确实有自己的一套政治思维，不跟风、没有哗众取宠，拥有新新人类的崭新思维。

大马政治生态老化

他表示：“在泰国，14岁至25岁的公民才叫做青年，至于菲律宾，14岁至30岁才是青年，从中可以看出大马政治生态远比其他国家老化或慢了一拍，导致时下很多年轻人都不热衷于参政，背后有两大牵绊，一是必须先念完大学，使到很多人对政治欠缺热诚和信心。”

“其次，一些资深领袖在位太久，很多年轻人若想出位，或必须经过漫长的等待，所以说，领袖在位太久也让年轻人没有机会施展才华和抱负。”

“一名20岁的年轻人和一名40岁的新中年，他们之间所要求的东西都不尽相同，如果年轻人对政治不感兴趣，意味着他们对生活已感到索味，可是在现实生活里政治却影响着各个层面。”

现年34岁的黄吉兴毕业于澳洲墨尔本大学建筑设计系，2007年加入人民公正党，属于政坛新兵。

他认为，资讯科技一日千里，新时代的年轻人有机会接触到来自各个不同管道的讯息，这跟他们祖父时代的情况完全不一样，因此，政府再也不能用之前的方式，尝试去控制每一个人，禁止大学生在校园内参政，约束媒体等，唯一的方法就是鼓励民众要有成熟的思想。

“在澳洲求学时，我曾经亲身体验过国家政权交替的经过，就以1996年澳洲劳工党倒台，自由党上台的经历，所以说，国家政权更迭的可能性是存在的，只不过是外国人的思想独立，对民众而言变天是好事一桩，须知唯一的定律就是改变之道理。”

他分析说，308全国大选后出现了一股现象，就是许多年轻人争相加入一些政党，这无关乎喜不喜欢，而是他们欲成为国家政权交替的一份子，问题在于这些人完全不晓得要做什么。

民联让年轻人看到希望

“1957年大马独立时，年轻人也一窝蜂的加入政党，所以，可说是与现在的感觉如出一辙，民联的出现让年轻人看到希望，他们期待明天会更好。”

“参政和参加政党是两码子的事情，参政是可以表明自己的立场，参政不代表就是政治人物，所以，年轻人应该表明自己立场，毕竟每一位年轻人对政治都有自己的理想和憧憬，只是须要时间和精力去实现理念。”

其实，他认为，何止是年轻人，生意人也应该表明本身的立场，毕竟政府所施行的政策也会影响到他们，在这方面，希望民联州政府勿秋后算帐。另外，画家、雕刻家、摄影师、音乐家和作家等，皆可以通过本身的作品对社会作出批判，表达对社会的不满。

岛市议员是一个平台

“不瞒你说，我从小就是领袖人物，目前是专业人士，在国内外拥有雄厚的网络，我相信可以学以致用，对槟州作出一些贡献。老实说，当你是小人物时，没有人要听你说话，槟岛市议员就是一个平台，让我有机会了解槟城人要的东西。”

身为一名市议员，他不苟同一些政治人物经常作出无谓的谩骂，把茅头指向别人，殊不知政府官员也是希望可以赶快把问题解决，对他们来说，他们也想知道为什么事情拖了这么久仍办不到，在这方面，新政府应该给予帮忙。

讲回自己在槟岛市政局的份内工作，吉兴说，他对市政局的期望高，对槟城来说是好事一桩，花多一点时间，才能够给槟城一些与众不同的东西，否则外国人为何要挑选槟城为旅游点，所以，这必须要有愿景和妥善的策划，以符合未来50年，甚至100年的需求。

语罢，吉兴随即翻了翻桌面上的城市规划报告书，边看边说：“如果这一本城市规划报告是建筑设计的论文，我一定批改不及格，为什么呢？因为毫无新意可言，我比较注重妇孺的利益，尤其是公共房屋计划及公园规划等问题。”

穷人聚集衍生社会问题

“就是公共房屋计划而言，政府在草拟中廉价屋时，其实是不应该把它列为给穷人居住的，穷人和穷人聚集在一起，或会衍生更多的社会问题，在兴建房屋过程期间亦会采纳较劣质的材料，让人下意识觉得穷人居住的地方相等于罪案之城，这不是一项完整的城市规划概念。”

“可是，若把低下阶层的民众放在高级住宅区内，恐怕也会衍生社会问题，所以，这一切都是必须从长计议的。”

How Low Can We Go?

By David Wyss

From Standard & Poor's Equity Research

The economy will likely suffer a moderate, but long recession, and a sluggish recovery, according to S&P Economics. From the December 2007 peak to a trough in May 2009, this expected 17-month recession would be longer than the 50-year average of 10.7 months, and near the longest recessions of 1975 and 1982.

S&P is also projecting two additional scenarios: one better than the baseline, and one worse.

BASELINE: A MODERATE RECESSION

We're forecasting negative gross domestic product (GDP) growth for the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first half of 2009 for a total decline of 0.9%. While business tax credits should likely provide some boost to the fourth quarter, borrowing restrictions will mean that boost will be smaller than we originally thought.

Still, this should be a moderate recession. Unemployment will likely climb to 7.5% by summer 2009 from its March 2007 low of 4.4%. The S&P 500 dropped nearly 40% through October 10, near the historical average decline of 36% during a recession. As stock prices normally lead the economy by three to six months, they should bottom in the fourth quarter.

The Fed chopped the Fed Funds rate to 1.5% from 5.25% last September. We expect the central bank to remain on hold until the recession is over before raising rates in the fall of 2009. The 10-year Treasury yield dropped to 3.8% from a peak of 4.5% last summer. However, the cost of funds for businesses and individuals has risen due to the credit crunch.

The fiscal stimulus package will likely bring the fiscal 2008 federal deficit slightly above the 2004 record of $413 billion. We expect the record to easily be broken next year, with a deficit exceeding $700 billion, depending on how the Troubled Asset Relief Plan is treated.

THE DOWNSIDE: EVERYTHING IS BROKEN

In our worst-case scenario, oil rebounds to its summer peak of $150 a barrel. Average home prices drop 40% by early 2010 from their July 2006 peak, compared with a 30% drop in the baseline forecast. Financial markets remain frozen. Foreign investors flee a falling dollar and bond defaults. Bond yields have to rise to attract the funds needed to balance the trade deficit, despite a cut in the Fed Funds rate to 0.5%.

Weak home prices will hit the consumer hard. Wealth drops 14% from its peak compared with 10% in the baseline. Consumer spending drops more sharply in the third quarter as households try to rebuild the wealth lost to weaker home and stock prices.

Real GDP declines 3.5% from its second-quarter 2008 peak to its third-quarter 2009 trough, the largest drop since World War II. At 20 months, this downturn would be longer than the 1975 and 1982 recessions. Unemployment tops out at 9.1% in early 2010 in this scenario.

Capital spending suffers from the weak economy and borrowing difficulties. Business investment falls 11% in 2009. Companies cut back on staffing. Nonfarm employment drops by 3.3 million during 2008 and 2009.

The slumping economy, various rescue plans, and the higher costs of federal retirement and health care programs hit the budget deficit, which jumps to $824 billion in fiscal 2009.

The current account deficit, on the other hand, improves to $326 billion in 2009 from the record $788 billion in 2006, as weak domestic demand cuts imports, and exports find support from the weaker dollar. The narrower trade gap helps reduce the need for foreign capital. However, the yield on the 10-year Treasury rises to 6.5% in 2011.

THE UPSIDE: A BORDERLINE RECESSION

In our optimistic scenario, we see a modest slowdown in growth this year and a return to above-normal growth in 2009 and thereafter. While optimistic, it's not unreasonable, by our analysis. In fact, it's near what our expectations were at this time last year.

In this scenario, a recession is not yet certain. Lower oil prices and a more rapid calming of financial markets could still keep the economy in "borderline recession" range.

A revival of productivity increases keep inflation under control despite stronger economic growth.

Oil prices drop to $75 a barrel by late 2009. Bond yields fall in response to lower inflation and increased confidence in the U.S. economy, which attracts more foreign inflows. Unemployment still rises to 6.6% next year from its current 6.1% rate, as real GDP growth recovers to 2.5% after the first quarter.

More robust growth also helps control the budget deficit.

Business investment rebounds more quickly because of the renewed demand growth, although nonresidential construction still declines in 2009 and 2010.

Housing recovers more quickly thanks to lower mortgage rates and a stronger economy. Starts rise from 950,000 in 2008 to 1.60 million, near their trend level, in 2011.

Consumer spending rises 1.6% in 2009, with auto sales getting the biggest boost from the rebounding economy and lower gasoline prices.

IT COULD BE WORSE

The real worry, we believe, is that the U.S. economy could do even worse than our pessimistic scenario — and repeat Japan's "lost decade," when growth averaged 0.8% from 1992 through 2002.

We think the parallels are clear. In both nations, the banking system was constrained by heavy capital losses resulting from property loans.

There are, however, some important differences. In Japan, the Bank of Japan was concerned about inflation well into the 1990s, when deflation had become the problem. As a result, they were too slow to cut interest rates. Consumers sharply increased their savings rate. Americans, so far, aren't letting prudence get in the way of spending. The more open U.S. financial markets should permit a quicker resolution, in our opinion, but political gridlock could delay any fixes.

The U.S. reliance on foreign capital exposes markets to greater risk than Japan, which was a major capital exporter. Commodity markets were calm during the 1990s; that's not the case now. Out-of-control health care costs are imposing a fiscal risk on the United States that wasn't apparent in Japan in the early 1990s.

Our hope is that policymakers in the United States have learned from Japan's failures. But, in our view, Congress and the press seem determined to repeat many of the same mistakes. To misquote Santayana, "Those who believe people have learned from the past haven't.